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THE TWENTY-FIFTH ANNIVERSARY OF
M Y LAI: A TIME TO INCULCATE
THE LESSONS
MAJOR JEFFREY F. ADDICOTT*
MAJOR WILLIAMA. HUDSON, JR.**
I. Introduction

The way of the superior m a n is like that of the
archer. When he misses the center of the target he turns
and seeks the cause of his failure in himselrl
If history teaches anything about avoiding the mistakes and
disasters of the past, it is that humanity first must understand
historical lessons-lessons often understood only after the expenditure of incredible amounts of human blood and treasure-and
then must inculcate those lessons in the members of each of its
succeeding generations.

As America passes the second anniversary of its victory in
the Persian Gulf War,2 correctly having heeded the lessons of
appeasement from World War II,3 another reminder of critical
historical lessons is rapidly approaching. Spring 1993 marks the
twenty-fifth anniversary of the My Lai massacre-an appropriate
time to revisit the event and to reinforce the lessons learned.
Representing the antithesis of the conduct of United States
Armed Forces during the Liberation and Defense of Kuwait, the
My Lai massacre was a nightmarish event that most Americans
would like to forget. Nevertheless, My Lai never must be forgotten.
Its horror and disgrace are precisely why My Lai must never be
erased from the individual memories of American citizens, nor
must it ever be lost from the legacy of the United States. To the
contrary, nothing provides a greater vehicle for inculcating the
~

~

*Judge Advocate General's Corps, United States Army. Currently assigned
to the International and Operational Law Division, Office of The Judge Advocate
General, U.S. Army.
**Judge Advocate General's Corps, U S . Army. Currently assigned as
Instructor, International Law Division, The Judge Advocate General's School, U.S.
Army.
'CONFUCIUS,THE ANALECTS OF CONFUCIUS
59 (Arthur Waley trans., 1939).
2See Michael Cramer, Kuwait: Back to the Past, TIME, Aug. 5, 1991, a t 33.
The ground phase of the military campaign in the Persian Gulf War lasted only
100 hours, from 24 to 28 February 1991. For an excellent overview of the entire
operation, see The Gulf War, MIL. REV., Sept. 1991.
3See THE NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES 6 (Jan.
1992).
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necessity for strict adherence to the law of war than the lessons
from the massacre at My Lai. From its engagements in Grenada in
1983, to Panama in 1989, to Kuwait in 1991, the United States
military can take full credit for its commendable record in adhering
to the law of war largely because of its commitment to institutionalizing the lessons learned from My Lai. Accordingly, every American
soldier must understand the significance of the My Lai massacre
and steadfastly must keep it in the forefront of his or her conscious.
11. The Massacre at My Lai

A. An Emblem of Shame
Every army has its own mythology, its symbols of heroism,
and its symbols of shame. The Army of the United States is no
exception. In the sphere of heroism, the American military has an
incredible reservoir of noble and fantastic figures to draw frommen whose military proficiency and ethical conduct in combat
have maintained an impeccable American reputation for both
battlefield excellence and strict adherence to the laws regulating
warfare.4 More than any other army in modern history, the
American Army is able to claim proudly as its own some of the
greatest soldiers in the history of warfare.
Unfortunately, the United States military also has its figures
of shame, soldiers who have engaged in blatant violations of the
most fundamental and civilized rules regulating behavior in
combat.5 While American misconduct is certainly an aberration
and not the norm, that does not lessen the severity of the shame.
Without question, each and every grave breach6 of the law of war
represents a horrible scar on the credibility of the American
military, as well as the civilized democracy it protects.
In this context, the greatest
shame in the twentieth century
War-a war few Americans yet
troops were involved in several

emblem of American military
occurred during the Vietnam
understand.7 While American
cases of unlawful killings of

4Jeffrey F. Addicott, Operation Desert Storm, R.E. Lee or W.T. Sherman?
136 MIL. L. REV. 115 (1992) (arguing that General R. E. Lee set such a standard
for the United States military).
51d.(pointing out the war crimes of General William T. Sherman during the
Civil War).
‘See infra note 44 and accompanying text.
7See, e.g., THE VIETNAM DEBATE (John Norton Moore ed., 1990); JOHN
NORTON MOORE, LAW AND THE INDO-CHINA WAR (1972). An entire series of myths
has persisted over the Vietnam War. These myths commonly have covered issues
such as the lawfulness of the American intervention, the nature and purpose of
the Communist Party in North Vietnam, and the reasons for the failure of the
United States to carry the war into North Vietnam to win a military victory.
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unarmed civilians during the Indo-China War, by far the most
violent-and hence the most infamous-of these incidents has
come to be called the My Lai massacre.
Any discussion of the American violations of the law of war
during Vietnam in general, and at My Lai in particular, must be
viewed against the background of the enemy’s activities. In this
context, American violations absolutely pale in comparison to the
many thousands of command-directed slaughters that were
committed by the communist regime of North Vietnam. Accordingly, though the incident was not atypical of the war in general,
the My Lai massacre certainly can be characterized as an
aberration with respect to the American presence in Vietnam.
The American record in Vietnam with regard t o
observance of the law of war is not a succession of war
crimes and does not support charges of a systematic
and willful violation of existing agreements for standards of human decency in time of war, as many critics
of the American involvement have alleged. Such
charges were based on a distorted picture of the actual
battlefield situation, on ignorance of existing rules of
engagement, and on a tendency t o construe every mistake of judgement as a wanton breach of the law of
war.8
In contrast, blatant violations of numerous provisions of the
law of war-including murder, torture, and intimidation-were
the modus operandi for the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese
Army.9 In one scholar’s estimate, North Vietnam sponsored the
slaughter of over one and a quarter million of its own people from
1945 to 1987.10 Included in this figure, since the fall of South
Vietnam in 1975, are over 250,000 Vietnamese “boat people” as
well as 250,000 other civilians who either were slaughtered
ruthlessly outright or perished in communist death camps created
to “re-educate” noncommunists.11 These massive crimes never
have been punished, much less acknowledged forcefully by human
rights groups. “In sum, re-education was a label for revenge,
punishment, and social prophylaxes. But unlike the Khmer Rouge
who were too public about their mass killing, the Vietnamese
regime cleverly and at first hid it from the outside world.”12
‘R.J. RUMMEL, DEATH BY GOVERNMENT:
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (forthcoming 1993)

GENOCIDE AND MASS MURDER IN
(manuscript a t 31, on file with

author).
’See infra note 52 and accompanying text.
~ORUMMEL,
supra note 8, manuscript at 1.
”Id. at 48-52.
I2Id. at 46.
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The enemy’s barbaric conduct should offer little solace to the
American conscience in the wake of My Lai. The record of
misconduct amassed by the communists in no way justifies what
occurred at My Lai; nevertheless, it helps to place the American
violations in a real-world perspective. For North Vietnam, the
strategy for a communist victory intentionally was predicated on
terror and propaganda; for the United States, the massacre a t My
Lai was a n unfortunate contradiction.

B. The Facts of M y Lai
The hard facts relating to the My Lai massacre are now
fairly certain, thanks to a thorough criminal investigation aimed
a t the perpetrators of the crime and a collateral administrative
investigation ordered by the Secretary of the Army and headed by
Lieutenant General W. R. Peers.13 Despite an initial cover-up by
some of those associated with the crime, the enormity of the
atrocity diminished the likelihood that it long could be kept
secret. Nevertheless, for well over a year, the general public knew
nothing of the incident.14
On March 16, 1968, an American combat task force of the
23d Infantry Division (the America1 Division)l5 launched an
airmobile assault into the village complex of Son My in the
province of Quang Ngai, South Vietnam. Like all such operations,
the attack was executed only after the commander of the task
force, Lieutenant Colonel Frank Barker, had assembled his key
junior commanders for a final review of the details of the combat
operation. This briefing, which took place on March 15, 1968,
involved discussions on the positioning of helicopters, the conduct
of artillery preparation, and the specific assignments of the three
companies that comprised what became known as Task Force
“Barker.” While the other two companies provided blocking and
support functions, Charlie Company, commanded by Captain
1 3 W R.~ PEERS
~ , ~THE~ MY LAI I NQUIRY (1979) [hereinafter P EERS
REPORT]. The Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff, United States Army,
issued a joint directive for Lieutenant General William R. Peers to explore the
original Army investigations of what had occurred on March 16, 1968, in Son My
Village, Quang Ngai Province, Republic of Vietnam. This investigation became
known as the Peers Report. Specifically, General Peers was tasked to determine
the following: (1)the adequacy of such investigations or inquiries and subsequent
reviews and reports within the chain of command; and (2) whether any
suppression or withholding of information by persons involved in the incident had
taken place. See also JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., T HE MY LAI MASSACRE AND ITS
COVER-UP: BEYOND THE REACH OF LAW? 29 (1976).
I4For an excellent discussion of the initial breaking of the story see William
Wilson, I Prayed to God That This Thing Was Fiction . . . , AMER.HERITAGE, Feb.
1990, a t 44.
I5Id. The troops making up the task force were from the 1st Battalion, 20th
Infantry, 11th Light Infantry Brigade.
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Ernest Medina, would take the primary responsibility for battling
any enemy resistance encountered in the village.
At the briefing, Lieutenant Colonel Barker reminded his
commanders that intelligence reports had indicated that the
village complex was a staging area for the 48th Viet Cong local
force battalion and that the Americans could expect a n enemy
force of up to 250 soldiers.16 Accordingly, the American soldiers
anticipated that they would be outnumbered by the enemy. Still,
having yet t o engage any enemy forces in direct combat, Task
Force Barker saw the operation as an opportunity finally to fight
the ever-elusive Viet Cong in the open.17
The intelligence on a large enemy force, however, proved to
be incorrect. When the American combat forces landed, they soon
found that the village was occupied almost totally by noncombatants.18 Although the civilians offered no resistance whatsoever,
some of the members of Charlie Company went on a commanddirected killing spree. Under the direct supervision of several
company grade officers-First Lieutenant William L. Calley, Jr.,
being the most notorious-American troops murdered well over
200 unarmed South Vietnamese civilians.19
The largest killing of civilians occurred in the hamlet of My
Lai, known to the Americans by the nickname of “Pinkville,”
which was part of the Son My complex. The murdered consisted
primarily of women, children, and old men; some were shot in
small groups, others were fired upon as they fled. At My Lai,
most of the civilians methodically had been herded into groups
and then gunned down. The largest group was killed under the
direct supervision of Lieutenant Calley.20
1 6 PREPORT
~ ~, supra
~ ~note 13, a t 47.Total enemy strength in Quang Ngai
Province in the spring of 1968 was thought t o be between 10,000 and 14,000 men.
I7GOLDSTEIN ET AL.,supra note 13, a t 492. The Son My area had been the
scene of numerous incidents in which many Americans had been killed or
wounded by booby traps and snipers during the few months prior to the My Lai
incident. Charlie Company had lost two dead and 13 wounded in a minefield on
February 25, 1968. On March 14, 1968, a popular sergeant had been killed and
three other soldiers wounded, by a booby trap. In total, Charlie Company had lost
20 soldiers killed or wounded in the Son My area.
“Id. at 103. The Peers Report made the following finding on enemy
combatants: “The evidence indicates that only three or four were confirmed as
Viet Cong, although there were undoubtedly several unarmed Viet Cong men,
women and children among them and many more active supporters and
sympathizers . . . .” Id.
”Although the official count of the dead was 175, this figure was certainly
low. The dead may have reached almost 400.Id. a t 1, 314.But see George Esper,
Twenty Years Later, M y Lai Remains a Symbol of Shame, L. A. TIMES, Mar. 13,
1988, a t 2A; RUMMEL, supra note 8, manuscript at 32 (putting the figure at 347).
The current communist regime in Vietnam has erected a plaque in My Lai with
the names of 540 men, women, and children listed as dying in the massacre.
2 o B ~see
t infra note 31.
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In addition to the unlawful killing of civilians, the soldiers
destroyed most of the homes and killed most of the domestic
animals in the village.21 Several cases of rape also were reported
to have taken place during the massacre.22 When it was over, the
statistics told the story: one American soldier in Charlie Company
had been wounded by friendly fire23 and hundreds of South
Vietnamese women, children, and elderly men were dead.
Perhaps the only redeeming aspect of the incident was the
fact that some of the American solders either had refused to
participate24 o r openly had attempted to halt the killings. Chief
Warrant Officer Hugh C. Thompson, Jr., was one of those who
took specific actions to halt the killings. Tasked with piloting one
of the helicopters during the operation, Chief Thompson testified
that he noticed large numbers of “wounded and dead civilians
everywhere.”25 Assuming that the Americans on the ground
would assist those who were wounded, which was the standard
procedure, Chief Thompson began to mark the location of the
wounded Vietnamese civilians with smoke canisters as he flew
overhead. To his horror, he witnessed the exact opposite. Drawn
to the smoke, American soldiers were shooting the wounded that
Chief Thompson had marked so accurately. Still only partially
realizing the full impact of what was happening on the ground,
Chief Thompson immediately headed his helicopter into My Lai,
and landed near a large drainage ditch filled with dead and dying
civilians. As he began to assist the Vietnamese who were still
alive, Lieutenant Calley and a handful of troops approached.
When Chief Thompson asked for assistance in caring for the
civilians, Lieutenant Calley clarified his intentions to kill the
remaining noncombatants. Chief Thompson recalled that Lieutenant Calley said of the civilians, “The only way you’ll get them out
is with a hand grenade.”26 Instead of backing down from the clear
21See P EERS R EPORT, supra note 13, at 277. The report from the Son My
Village Chief, dated March 22, 1968, indicated that 90% of the animals and
houses as destroyed.
”See Esper, supra note 19; GOLDSTEIN
ET AL.,supra note 13, at 343. The
Peers Report made the following specific findings in reference to one platoon
leader, Lieutenant Steven K. Brooks: “Although he knew that a number of his
men habitually raped Vietnamese women in villages during operations, on 16
March 1968, he observed, did not prevent, and failed to report several rapes by
members of his platoon while in My Lai , . . on 16 March.”
23See GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 13, a t 493. The single casualty probably
was a self-inflicted gun shot wound by one of the members of Company C who was
seeking to avoid participation in the operation.
24See Wilson, supra note 14, a t 49. One of the soldiers who had refused t o
participate was Sergeant Michael Bernhardt. Sergeant Bernhardt, however, did
not attempt to halt his fellow soldiers from the killings. He stated, “It was point
blank murder, and I was standing there watching it.” Id.
251d. at 50.
261d.
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designs of a superior officer, however, Chief Thompson quickly
ordered his M60 machine gunner, Private First Class Lawrence
Colburn, to open fire on the United States soldiers if they came
any closer t o the remaining civilians. Chief Thompson then placed
all the civilians he could on his helicopter and ferried them t o
safety.

C. My Lai Comes to Light
The initial attempts t o cover up the crime could not quell the
nightmares of those who had witnessed the slaughter. Rumors of
the massacre persisted, coming t o a boiling point when an exserviceman named Ron Ridenhour sent a second-hand account of
the massacre to President Richard Nixon, “twenty three members
of Congress, the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Secretary of
the Army, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.”27
Ridenhour had written a four-page letter that chronicled detailed
information from several of the soldiers who either had taken
part in the bloody massacre or had witnessed it first hand. The
letter read in part as follows:
It was late in April, 1968 that I first heard of
“Pinkville” [(My Lai)]. . . . It was in the end of June,
1968 when I ran into Sargent [sic] Larry La Croix at
the US0 in Chu Lai. La Croix had been in 2nd Lt.
Kally’s [sicl platoon on the day Task Force Barker
swept through “Pinkville.” What he told me verified the
stories of the others, but he also had something new t o
add. He had been a witness t o Kally’s [sic] gunning
down of a t least three separate groups of villagers. “It
was terrible. They were slaughtering the villagers like
so many sheep.” Kally’s [sicl men were dragging people
out of bunkers and hootches and putting them together
in a group. The people in the group were men, women
and children of all ages. As soon as he felt that the
group was big enough, Kally [sicl ordered an M-60
(machine gun) set up and the people killed. La Croix
said he bore witness to this procedure a t least three
times. ... This account of Sargent La Croix confirmed
the rumors that Gruver, Terry and Doherty had
previously told me about Lieutenant Kally [sicl . . . . I
have considered sending this to newspapers, magazines,
and broadcasting companies, but I somehow feel that
investigation and action by the Congress of the United
States is the appropriate procedure. . . .28
271d.at 46.
2

8

GET AL~., supra
~ note
~ 13,~at 36.
~

~

~

~
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Ron Ridenhour’s letter received prompt attention both in the
media and in the legislative and executive branches of the federal
government. The initial military reaction was one of disbelief. No
one believed that a massacre of that magnitude could have been
committed by American soldiers or that the massacre “could have
remained hidden for so long.”29

As the horrible truth of the crime came to light, however, the
Army quickly launched the comprehensive Peers Commission
investigation, popularly known as the Peers Report.30 At the
same time, the general public tasted the horror of the My Lai
massacre through a series of gruesome photographs of the dead,
which had been taken by a former Army photographer named
Ronald Haeberle. The color photographs appeared in the December 1969 issue of Life magazine.

D. The Impact of M y Lai
Charges were preferred against four officers31 and nine
enlisted men32 for their involvements in the My Lai massacre. In
“PEERS REPORT supra note 13, at 7; see also GOLDSTEIN ET A L . , supra note
13, at 274-75. The Army knew that the communists had reported the alleged
killing of civilians a t My Lai, but the reports largely were ignored, in keeping
with the common communist technique of outrageous propaganda. One notice that
was captured in late March 1968 was entitled “Concerning Crimes Committed by
US Imperialists and Their Lackeys Who Killed More Than 500 Civilians at Tinh
Khe Village (Son My), Son Tinh District.” It stated the following:
Xam Lang (Thuan Yen) Subhamlet of Tu Cung Hamlet and
Xom Go Subhamlet of Co Luy were pounded by artillery for hours.
After shelling, nine helicopters landed troops who besieged the two
small hamlets, killing and destroying. They formed themselves into
three groups: one group was in charge of killing civilians, one group
burned huts, and the third group destroyed vegetation and trees and
killed animals. Wherever they went, civilians were killed, houses and
vegetation were destroyed and cows, buffalo, chickens, and ducks
were also killed. They even killed old people and children: pregnant
women were raped and killed. This was by far the most barbaric
killing in human history.
30See PEERS REPORT, supra note 13; supra text accompanying note 13.
3 1 T ~ oother key officers involved in the massacre, Lieutenant Steven
Brooks and Lieutenant Colonel Frank Barker, had been killed in Vietnam before
the formal investigation into My Lai had begun. The Peers Report found that
Lieutenant Brooks had “directed and supervised the men of his platoon in the
systematic killing of a t least 60-70 noncombatants in the subhamlets of My Lai
and Binh Tay.” The Peers Report also found that Colonel Barker had been
involved in the cover-up of the massacre. See GOLDSTEIN ET AL ., supra note 13, at
343. The officers charged with murder were Captain Ernest L. Medina, Captain
Eugene M. Kotouc, First Lieutenant William L. Calley, J r . , and First Lieutenant
Thomas K. Willingham. See Peers Report, supra note 13, at 227.
32Theenlisted men charged with murder were Sergeant Kenneth L. Hodges,
Sergeant Charles E. Hutton, Sergeant David Mitchell, Sergeant Escquiel Torres,
Specialist Four William F. Doherty, Specialist Four Robert W. TSouvas, Corporal
Kenneth Schiel, Private Max Hutson, and Private Gerald A. Smith. See PEERS
REPORT, supra note 13, at 227.
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addition, twelve other officers were charged with military offenses
associated with the cover-up.33 Of these twenty-five accused
soldiers, only Lieutenant William Calley was convicted.34 The
other officers and enlisted men either successfully moved t o have
the charges against them dismissed or were found not guilty at
their courts-martial.
Tried before a military panel composed of six officers,
Lieutenant Calley was found guilty of the premeditated murder of
twenty-two noncombatants and of assault with intent t o murder a
two-year-old child. Although Calley was sentenced to a dismissal
and confinement a t hard labor for life, the convening authority
reduced this sentence t o a dismissal and twenty years at hard
labor. Subsequent t o the convening authority’s action, the
Secretary of the Army further reduced the sentence to a dismissal
and ten years at hard labor.35
Aside from the issue of individual culpability for those
involved in the massacre, My Lai had a devastating impact on the
outcome of the Vietnam War. In particular, because the United
States apparently had no grand strategy to win the war,36 this
one atrocity arguably did as much to harm the survival of an
independent South Vietnam as any other single event during the
Indo-China War. The public revelation of this massacre not only
solidified the anti-war movement in the United States, but also
cast a pall of confusion and shame over the nation at large. This
aura contributed significantly to the eventual abandonment of
South Vietnam to the communist forces in the North. Beginning
in 1969, a vocal minority of war protesters incorporated the
United States soldier into their opposition to the war. For many
of these people, the enemy was now the American fighting mannot the communists.
3 3 T h e ~ econsisted of Major General Samuel W. Koster, Brigadier General
George H. Young, Colonel Oran K. Henderson, Colonel Nels A. Parson, Lieutenant
Colonel Robert B. Luper, Major Charles C. Calhoun, Major David C. Gavin, Major
Robert W. McKnight, Major Frederic W. Watke, First Lieutenant Kenneth W.
Boatman, and First Lieutenant Dennis H. Johnson. See PEERS REPORT, supra note
13, a t 221-22.
34United States v. Calley, 48 C.M.R. 19 (C.M.A. 1973).
35William Calley, Jr., actually served a total of only three years under
house arrest a t Fort Benning, Georgia, and six months a t the confinement facility
at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas (from June 1974 to November 1974). Calley was
released from confinement at Fort Leavenworth when his sentence was
overturned by a federal district judge in Georgia. When the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals reinstated the conviction, Calley was not returned to confinement;
instead, he was paroled by the Secretary of The Army in 1975. He works today in
his father-in-law’s jewelry store in Columbus, Georgia. See Wilson supra note 14,
a t 53.
36See infra text accompanying notes 73-75.
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Within the military, the revelation of what happened at My
Lai was a devastating blow to esprit de corps and professionalism.
Even now, twenty-five years after the incident, the United States
Army continues to recover from the pain that the My Lai
massacre inflicted-a pain that still lingers in the very soul of
every American soldier.37

111. Why Did My Lai Happen?
Notwithstanding the social and political machinations that
were brewing in the United States in the late 1960s and early
1970s, Americans had little problem focusing on the immediate
question raised in the aftermath of the massacre-that is, “Why
did My Lai happen?” The nation legitimately wondered how so
many American soldiers could have become involved in such a
heinous war crime.38 More importantly, Americans wondered how
the officers in command of the operation could have ordered such
atrocities or could have participated in the attempt to cover them
up. To realize that some civilians are killed as a collateral matter
through military action against legitimate military targets was
one thing; t o have ground forces intentionally shoot innocent
noncombatants in cold blood was incomprehensible.

A. The Peers Report
The Peers Report did not limit the cause of the My Lai
massacre to only one factor. While the panel observed that “what
may have influenced one man to commit atrocities had no effect
on another,”39 General Peers was determined that the final report
should reflect some explanation as to why the massacre had
occurred. Recognizing the inherent difficulty in finger pointing,
31Army Teaches Gulf Soldiers How to Avoid My Lai Type Massacre,
PITTSBURGH PRESS, Feb. 24, 1991, a t A12 [hereinafter Avoid My Lail.
38For a legal definition of the term, DEP’T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 27-10,
THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE, para. 499 (July 1956) [hereinafter FM 27-101 (“The
term war crime is the technical expression for a violation of the law of war by any
person or persons, military or civilian. Every violation of the law of war is a war
crime”). The definition in FM 27-10 would include both customary and treaty law
in the realm law of war. For a layman’s definition, see also INT’L L. DIV., T HE
JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL, US. ARMY, JA 401, INTERNATIONAL LAW
BASIC COURSE DESKBOOK
4-2 (July 1992) (“A non-legal, generic term for all illegal
actions relating to the inception or conduct of warfare. It includes all the separate
categories of offenses tried at Nuremburg. A more accurate term for this would be:
Crimes under International Law”) Under a strict definition, the murder of civilian
co-belligerents would be a crime, but not necessarily a war crime because the
victims would not be protected persons under any international agreement or
general customary principles relating to the conduct of war. By popular reference,
however, such acts commonly are referred to as war crimes.
3 9 P REPORT
~ ~ , supra
~ ~ note 13, a t 229.
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the panel nonetheless identified several factors that seemed to be
conducive t o an environment that might lead to violations of the
law of war.
1. Lack of Proper Training.-The lack of proper training in
the law of war was a common theme in the interviews of the
witnesses and subjects involved in the My Lai massacre. Perhaps
the most graphic illustration of this factor appeared at the trial of
Lieutenant Calley, when Calley testified that the Geneva
Convention classes conducted during Officer Candidate School
were inadequate.40 Regardless of the overall veracity of Calley’s
claim, the Peers Report entered specific findings that the soldiers
who composed Task Force Barker had not received sufficient
training in the “Law of War (Hague and Geneva Conventions),
the safeguarding of noncombatants, or the Rules of Engagement.”41 Although the requirements set out in United States
Army Republic of Vietnam (USARV) Regulation 350-1, dated 10
November 1967, clarified that, at a minimum, all soldiers were
required t o have annual refresher training in the Geneva
Conventions, many commanders failed t o emphasize this requirement. Consequently, individual soldiers often lacked proper
training on the requirements imposed by these conventions.

The Commission also found that, although pocket-size
guidance cards were issued to all soldiers t o help them learn and
abide by the law of war, the soldiers usually never read the
information on the cards and the cards themselves rarely
survived the first monsoon rains.42 In addition, Military Assistance Command Vietnam Directive 20-4,43 which required the
immediate reporting of all violations of the law of war, seldom
was stressed by the command structure.
Despite these particular shortcomings, however, the Peers
Report did not find deficiencies in the law of war training to be a
*‘See United States v. Calley, 46 C.M.R. 1131 (A.C.M.R.), afd, 22 C.M.A.
534, 48 C.M.R. 19 (1973). But see Interview with Lindsay Dorrier by Major Jeffrey
Addicott, in Charlottesville, Va. (12 Mar. 1992). A former classmate of Calley, Mr.
Dorrier recalls that the Officer Candidate School did provide adequate law of war
training t o the students. Actually, all those going through Officer Candidate
School received training in the four Geneva Conventions.
4 1 P REPORT
~ ~ , supra
~ ~ note 13, a t 230.
42See GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 13, at 220. Four of the cards were
entitled “The Enemy in Your Hands,” “Nine Rules,” “Code of Conduct,” and
“Geneva Conventions.”
43SeeMilitary Assistance Command Vietnam, Directive 20-4 (20 Apr. 1965)
(requiring the immediate reporting of any alleged violation of the law of war to
the next higher military authority, as well as directly to Headquarters, Military
Assistance Command Vietnam, located in Saigon).
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significant reason for the grave breaches44 that occurred at My
Lai. Such deficiencies in training might excuse minor or technical
breaches of the law of war, but not the grave malum in se
breaches that were before the Commission. The members of the
Commission correctly noted that “there were some things a
soldier did not have to be told were wrong-such as rounding up
women and children and then mowing them down, shooting
babies out of mother’s arms, and raping.”45 Therefore, the
Commission apparently had no hesitation in concluding that some
of the members of the company-both enlisted men and officerssimply were criminals.46 These individuals clearly were in an
environment in which little, if anything, deterred them from
overtly expressing their criminal propensities.
2. Attitude Toward the Vietnamese.-In addition t o the lack
of proper training, a tendency by some of the members of Charlie
Company to view the Vietnamese people as almost subhuman was
another factor that may have contributed to the massacre. The
use of derogatory terms to describe the Vietnamese as nothing but
“gooks,” “dinks,” or “slopes” was not uncommon during the
Vietnam War. Actually, soldiers in all wars have developed
derogatory phrases to describe their enemies;47 such characterizations of inferiority inure soldiers t o killing their enemy. In the My
Lai case, however, the Peers Report concluded that some of the
members of Charlie Company had carried this practice of
dehumanizing the enemy to an unreasonable extreme, viewing
44The term “grave breaches” technically is related only to specific violations
defined as such in the Geneva Conventions. Grave breaches include specific acts
committed against persons or property such as willful killing, torture, or inhuman
treatment, including biological experiments, willfully causing great suffering, or
willfully causing serious injury to body or health. See FM 27-10 supra note 35, at 179.
4 5 P RE~PORT
~, supra
~ ~ note 13, a t 230.
46Whileone may possess a propensity for criminal behavior, all behavior is
controlled directly by the individual’s volition. In turn, the act of choosing to
commit a crime often is related to a crude cost-benefit analysis process. Obviously,
crime more likely will occur in an environment in which the likelihood of
punishment is minimal. For an excellent discussion on how the criminal mind
functions, see Dr. Stanton E. Samenow, Jr., INSIDE THE CRIMINAL MIND 6 (1984).
Criminals cause crime-not bad neighborhoods, inadequate
parents, television, schools, drugs, or unemployment. Crime resides in
the minds of human beings and is not caused by social conditions.
Once we as a society recognize this simple fact, we shall take
measures radically different from current ones. To be sure, we shall
continue to remedy intolerable social conditions for this is worthwhile
in and of itself. But we shall not expect criminals to change because
of such efforts.
Id.
471nWorld War 11, Americans called the Germans “Krauts” and called the
Japanese “Nips.” In the Gulf War, some United States troops referred t o the
Iraqis as “Rag Heads.”
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the “Vietnamese with contempt, considering them subhuman, on
the level of dogs.”48
To discover the reason for such unsettling hatred, the Peers
Report had a detailed background analysis performed on each
individual in Company C. The results, however, revealed nothing
unusual. The company was a then-average unit with seventy
percent of its troops having high school diplomas and nineteen
percent having some college education. The Commission concluded that the hatred was a result of a combination of several
factors, the greatest of which was merely the arrogance inherent
in the criminal mind; the least of which was the frustration of
having t o fight an enemy who refused to abide by the law of
war .49
3. Nature of the Enemy.-One of the most telling factors
listed in the Peers Report dealt with examining the nature of the
enemy forces that infested South Vietnam, with the implicit
criticism that the United States military never was allowed t o
take the war t o the real enemy-North Vietnam. In the South,
the United States military was asked to carry out primarily
defensive operations against a well-trained and well-equipped
guerilla force that not only was indistinguishable from the local
population, but also refused to abide by the established principles
of the law of war.

They would set up their bunkers in villages and
attack from the midst of helpless civilians. Thus,
surrounding themselves with and using innocent civilians to protect themselves is in itself a war crime and
makes them criminally responsible for the resulting
civilian dead. . .. [Tlhey would also directly attack
villages and hamlets, kill the inhabitants, including
children, in order to panic the civilians in the area and
cause social chaos that the communist then could
exploit.50
The Viet Cong and regular North Vietnamese Army soldiers
knew every path, trail, and hut in their areas of operation. In
addition, whether by brute force-which included public torture
and execution-or by psychological intimidation, the Viet Cong
could count on the local support of the civilian population for
shelter, food, and intelligence. Similarly, these soldiers commonly
could depend on women and children t o participate actively in
8 P RE~PORT
~ , supra
~ ~ note 13, at 230.
49See infra text accompanying notes 51-52.
50RUMMEL, supra note 8, a t 24.
4
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military operations against United States forces.51 With women
and children participating in actual combat activities-such as
laying booby traps, serving as scouts, or carrying arms-the
American soldier had to disregard the traditional indicators of sex
and age as criteria for categorizing the noncombatant and,
instead, had to concentrate on the extremely difficult issue of
hostile intent. The Peers Report recognized this dilemma.
The communist forces in South Vietnam had long
recognized our general reluctance to do battle with
them among the civilian populace and had used that
knowledge to our tactical and strategic disadvantage
throughout the history of the war in Vietnam. Exploitation of that reluctance by . . . [the enemy] forces caused
a distortion of the classic distinction between combatants and noncombatants.52
Distinguishing between friend and foe among military-aged
male Vietnamese was even more difficult. Having developed an
incredible system of underground tunnels and caves, the Viet
Cong and North Vietnamese Army were able to appear and
disappear at will. Moreover, when under pressure, these soldiers
took only seconds to remove all military insignia and equipment,
and blend in with the local population.
Without question, the use of guerilla tactics, characterized
by a heavy reliance on booby traps and hit-and-run missions, had
a tremendous adverse psychological impact on American commanders and their troops. After numerous interviews, the Peers
Report noted that the general attitude of the soldier was one of
extreme tension about engaging this unseen enemy-an enemy
who hid behind women and children and would not come out in
the open to do battle.53
Every civilian was viewed as a potential threat; every inch of
ground was a potential hiding place for a booby trap or mine.
Accordingly, descriptive terms such as “keyed up” frequently were
used to describe the apprehension and frustration associated with
going out on patrol or, in many cases, just being in a friendly
village.54 The Viet Cong commonly would visit a friendly village
a t night, setting mines that would kill Americans the next day.
Consequently, some of those who testified naturally assumed that
51GOLDSTEIh. ET A L . ,

Supra note 13, at 199.

521d.a t 198-99.
53 Id.

5 4 P ~REPORT
~ ~ s, supra note 13, at 234. The suggestions that members of
Task Force Barker were either high on marijuana or intoxicated were found to be
without substance and not a significant factor in the operation.
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the “effects of mines and booby traps were the main reason for
the atrocities committed by the task force.”55 This view is
incorrect. While these factors undoubtedly contributed to the
extraordinary level of tension in Task Force Barker, citing the
illegal warfighting tactics of the enemy as the primary reason for
the atrocity would be far too simplistic. Actually, if this factor was
the main cause for My Lai, one would have expected many
massacres similar t o My Lai to have taken place throughout
Vietnam.

4. Organizational Problems.-One of the dominant characteristics of the Vietnam War was the lack of effective organization
in the United States Army’s force structure. In the realm of
directing combat operations, the lack of effective command and
control can be disastrous. From the brigade level, down t o
platoons, shortages of personnel and frequent rotations resulted
in ad hoc arrangements in composing military units.
Adding to the organizational deficiencies was the influx of
poorly trained or ill-disciplined troops who were assigned to
Vietnam on “short” tours of only one year.56 These short tours
virtually ensured that problems in command and control would
arise. By the time the soldier had gained the necessary experience
to be a n effective member of a unit, he was eligible for transfer
back to the “States.”
Taking strong note of the overall organizational problems
throughout the Army structure in Vietnam, the Peers Report
found that certain specific organizational problems in Task Force
Barker “played the most prominent part in the My Lai
incident.”57 Focusing on the structure of Task Force Barker, the
report noted that the lack of staff personnel was a serious
impediment to effective command and control. The task force
“could hardly function properly, particularly in such matters as
development of intelligence, planning and supervision of operations, and even routine administration.”58
In addition to the general organizational problems in the
task force, the plans and orders that delineated the operation into
Son My lacked clarity. Because the entire operation was based on
intelligence that anticipated a large enemy force in the area, the
American soldiers initially expected that they were going to be
551d.at 235.
‘‘Id. Many of the combat officer positions were rotated after only six
months in the field.
571d.

581d.at 235.
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outnumbered by a t least two t o one.59 In addition, the task force
leaders regularly employed the term l‘search and destroy”60
without providing an adequate definition to the troops. Despite
the term’s connotation, “search and destroy” never was meant to
provide soldiers with a “license to kill” whoever was encountered
during an operation. In particular, the Peers Report found that
the command gave no instructions to its soldiers on how to handle
the civilians that they inevitably would encounter during the Son
My operation.61

5. Leadershzp. -In the final analysis, organizational problems contributed to an overall atmosphere that made the events
a t My Lai possible. The most fundamental aspect of the task
force’s pervasive structural deficiency, however, was the command
and control problem created by the tremendous lack of leadership
at the ground level.
‘You know what t o do with them,” [Lieutenant]
Calley said, and walked off. Ten minutes later he
returned and asked, “Haven’t you got rid of them yet? I
want them dead. Waste them.” . . . . We stood about ten
to fifteen feet away from them [a group of eighty men,
women, and children herded together] and then [Lieutenant Calley] started shooting them. I used more than
a whole clip-used four or five clips.62

As with almost any military operation, success or failure
depends, t o a t least some degree, on proper leadership. In the
case of My Lai, however, the lack of responsible leadership was
obvious. More importantly, as the above passage indicates, that
failure of leadership was manifest a t the very level a t which it
was most critical-the junior officer leve1.63 Although the Peers
59See supra note 16 and accompanying text.

6 0 PREPORT
~ ~, supra
~ ~ note 13, a t 236. The military no longer uses the
term “search and destroy.” During the Vietnam War, it was defined as a “military
operation conducted for the purpose of seeking out and destroying enemy forces,
installations, resources, and base areas.” See GOLDSTEIN ET AL ., supra note 13, a t
389.
6 1 P REPORT
~ ~ , supra
~ ~ note 13, a t 237.
62Wilson, supra note 14, at 52 (citing Private Paul D. Medlo (1969));
GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 13, at 499. Another witness, Private First Class
Dennis Conti, related a t the trial of Lieutenant Calley that he and Medlo were
told to “take care of the people.” When Lieutenant Calley returned, however, he
was upset that the civilians had not been killed. Lieutenant Calley then stated, “I
mean kill them.”
63The My Lai massacre was not the only command-directed atrocity in
Vietnam. A few less extensive killings occurred in which superiors unlawfully
ordered subordinates to kill civilians. See, e.g., GARY D. SOLIS,MARINES AND
MILITARY LAW IN VIETNAM: TRIAL BY FIRE 176 (1989).
[Lance Corporal] Herrod gave the order to kill . . . the people,
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Report faulted all levels of command, noting that “at all levels,
from division down to platoon, leadership or the lack of it was
perhaps the principal causative factor in the tragic events before,
during, and after the My Lai operation,”6* the direct underlying
deficiency most certainly rested at the company and platoon level.
By virtue of the chain of command structure of the military,
the primary responsibility for ensuring adherence t o the law of
war rests on the officer corps. This structure demands the highest
levels of professionalism from the junior officers at the platoon
and company level, at which soldiers are most apt t o encounter
the vast majority of law of war issues. Simply put, soldiers are
expected t o obey the law of war and their officers are expected to
ensure that they do.
The difficult issue in enforcing the law of war is not in how
to deal with soldiers or officers who, in their individual capacities,
violate the law of war-they normally are punished by courtsmartial.65 Rather, the really difficult issues arise when an officer
orders his or her soldiers t o commit war crimes, or knowingly
fails to control soldiers under his or her command who violate the
law of war.66 Clearly, the most difficult issue to arise from the My
and I told him not to do it . . . . Then he says, “Well, I have orders to
do this by the company commander, and I want it done,” and he said
it again, “I want these people killed!” And I turned to PFC Boyd, and
I said to PFC Boyd, “Is he crazy, or what?” And Boyd said, “I don’t
know, he must be.” . . . And then everybody started opening up on the
people.
Id. (quoting Lance Corporal Michael S. Krichten, Vietnam 1970).
6 4 P ~REPORT
~ ~ s, supra note 13, at 232.
65See FM 27-10, supra note 38, para. 506(a). Under the Geneva
Conventions, each nation is under a strict obligation to search for all persons
alleged to have committed war crimes, to investigate the allegations of war
crimes, and t o prosecute or extradite those so accused. The policy of the United
States is that all American military personnel so accused will be prosecuted by
military courts-marital under the substantive provisions of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice. See also GERHARDVON GLAHN,LAW AMONG NATIONS 870-91
(1991).
66See LAWRENCE TAYLOR, A TRIAL OF GENERALS 165-67 (1981). Under the
concept of command responsibility or indirect responsibility, a commander can be
charged with the law of war violations committed by his or her subordinates if he
or she ordered the crimes committed or “knew that a crime was about to be
committed, had the power to prevent it, and failed to exercise that power.” In the
United States, this standard has come to be known as the Medina Standard, so
named for Captain Ernest Medina. A second standard for indirect responsibility
that has been the object of a great deal of debate and is recognized only in the
United States, is the Yamashita Standard. The Yamashita Standard is named for
the World War I1 Japanese general, Tomoyuki Yamashita, who was tried before a
military commission for war crimes committed by soldiers under his command.
The primary charge against Yamashita concerned 20,000 Japanese sailors under
his command who went on a murder and rape rampage in Manila near the end of
the war. Although the prosecution was unable to prove that Yamashita ordered
the crimes, or even knew about them, he was convicted under a “should have
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Lai incident was how to reconcile command-directed breaches of
the law of war with the concept of following orders. If every
soldier is expected to obey the lawful order of a superior, lest face
the ominous prospect of a court-martial, how should a soldier
react to a n unlawful order-that is, of course, assuming the
soldier actually can recognize the order as an unlawful 0ne?67
In considering the question whether a superior
order constitutes a valid defense, the court shall take
into consideration the fact that obedience t o lawful
military orders is the duty of every member of the
armed forces; that the latter cannot be expected, in
conditions of war discipline, to weigh scrupulously the
legal merits of the orders received; that certain rules of
warfare may be controversial; or that an act otherwise
amounting t o a war crime may be done in obedience to
orders conceived as a measure of reprisal. At the same
time it must be borne in mind that members of the
armed forces are bound to obey only lawful orders.68
Furthermore, soldiers normally cannot depend on the
defense of superior orders to protect them from charges that they
carried out unlawful orders. Instead, the law holds the soldier
fully responsible for his or her acts or omissions. When a soldier
raises superior orders as a defense, however, a court will apply a
two-tier test to determine if the defense is cognizable. The first
tier is a subjective one concentrating on whether or not the
accused knew that the order was illegal. If the accused did not
know that the order was illegal then the inquiry shifts to the
second tier, a t which the court must determine whether the
accused reasonably could have been expected to know that the
order was illegal. “The fact that the law of war has been violated
pursuant to an order of a superior authority . . . does not
constitute a defense . . . unless [the accused1 did not know and
could not reasonably have been expected to know that the act
ordered was unlawful.”69 Although the objective tier of the twopart test draws upon the “reasonable man” standard, the
known” standard. This standard permits a commander to be found guilty for war
crimes under a theory that, through normal events, the commander should have
known of the war crimes of those under his or her command, and did nothing to
stop them. The commander, therefore, is vicariously guilty of the actions of his or
her soldiers. This “should have known” standard applies only when the war
crimes are associated with a widespread pattern of abuse over a prolonged period
of time. In such a scenario, the commander is presumed to have knowledge of the
crime o r to have abandoned his o r her command.
67See FM 27-10, supra note 38, para. 509.
681d. para. 509.
6 9 ~ .
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standard actually considers the actions of a reasonable man under
the stresses present in the particular combat environment.
The task of distinguishing the legitimacy of the orders of a
superior also must be viewed against the entire concept of
enforced discipline, which the military systematizes from the first
day a recruit enters boot camp until the day he or she is
discharged. The requirement for enforced discipline is absolutely
essential t o ensure that in the unnatural conditions of the combat
environment soldiers will be able to function properly. No army
could survive without a system promoting genuine and enforced
discipline, which is rooted firmly in the requirement t o obey the
directions of superiors. Accordingly, if soldiers are expected t o
obey all lawful orders, a fortiori, they reasonably cannot be
expected to scrupulously weigh the legal merits of orders received
under the stresses of combat.70
Consequently, an army must fill its officer corps with only
the finest available men and women. Nowhere is this requirement
more essential than in the selection and placement of the men
who serve as officers in combat units. Only men of the highest
moral caliber and military skill should be assigned the responsibility of combat command. In commenting on leadership skills
for officers, General George S. Patton, Jr., correctly stated, “If you
do not enforce and maintain discipline, [officers] are potential
murderers.”71
General Patton’s comment prophesied the tragedy at My Lai.
Several of the junior officers on the scene were totally inadequate,
not only in their moral characters and integrities, but also in
basic military skills. As they exhibited by their behaviors,72 these
officers were totally unworthy of the responsibility of command.
They were murderers.
Not surprisingly, William Calley-the centerpiece of the
command-directed killings-was not the type of individual who
70

WHO

Id.

“PETER B. WILLIAMSON,
MEAN I T 35 (1979).

PATTON’S PRINCIPLES: A

HANDBOOK FOR

MANAGERS

72See supra note 46 and accompanying text. For an interesting observation
concerning the nature of man, see THE DICTIONARY OF WAR QUOTATIONS 341
(Justin Wintle ed., 1989). Anne Frank wrote the following in 1942:
I don’t believe that the big men, the politicians and the
capitalists alone, are guilty of war. Oh no, the little man is just as
guilty, otherwise the peoples of the world would have risen in revolt
long ago. There’s in people simply an urge to destroy, an urge to kill,
to murder and rage, and until all mankind, without exception,
undergoes a great change, wars will be waged, everything that has
been built up, cultivated, and grown will be destroyed and disfigured,
after which mankind will have to begin all over again.
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should have been charged with leadership responsibilities of any
nature. Having flunked out of a junior college in Miami, Calley
moved west before enlisting in the Army in 1966.73 Once in the
Army, Calley somehow was selected to attend Officers Candidate
School, where he graduated despite poor academic marks.74
Assigned to the field as a platoon leader in a combat unit, the
soldiers under his command quickly discovered that Lieutenant
Calley did not even understand basic military combat skills. As
one rifleman in the platoon put it, “I wonder how he ever got
through Officer Candidate School. [Calley] couldn’t read no darn
[sic] map and a compass would confuse his ass.”75
Accordingly, the factor that impacted most directly on the
crime a t My Lai certainly rested on the shoulders of a few junior
officers on the ground-Lieutenant William Calley being one of
the worst. All of the evidence suggests that Lieutenant Calley
initiated much of the murder, acting both in his individual
capacity and-far more shamefully-in his capacity as an officer
in charge of subordinates. Abusing the authority of his position,
Lieutenant Calley directly ordered the soldiers under his
command t o commit murder; some of the men obeyed, while some
did not. While no one can pardon the behavior of those who
carried out the illegal orders, the real tragedy of My Lai was the
absence of competent leadership.
As Sun Tzu laid out almost 2500 years ago, “The commander
stands for the virtues of wisdom, sincerity, benevolence, courage,
and strictness.”76 Instead of setting the standard for moral
conduct, Calley performed exactly in the opposite manner. He
represented the antithesis of what a commander should be.
6. The Lack of a Grand Strategy by the United States.-A
final factor that bears exploration is one that few commentators
on My Lai have properly gauged-that is, the full impact that the
lack of a grand strategy by the United States had on the outcome
of the Indo-China conflict. My Lai actually was made possible
because of the total and complete absence of a grand strategy to
deal with the communist-sponsored aggression against South
Vietnam.

If the concept of a grand strategy is defined as the use of a
state’s full national power t o achieve a particular objective, the
United States clearly had no grand strategy for dealing with the
73Wilson, supra note 14, a t 50.
74 Id.
751d.(remarks of Rifleman Roy L. A. Wood).
7 6 T A~RT~O F W AR : SUN Tzu 9 (James Clavell ed., 1983)

19931

25TH ANNIVERSARY OF M Y Ltll

173

communist aggression in Vietnam. The communists, on the other
hand, obviously had a complete and dedicated grand strategy for
conquering all of Indo-China through the use of revolutionary
warfare.77

A sound grand strategy envisages the means by which a
nation will take advantage of its strengths and will exploit its
enemy’s vulnerabilities; concomitatantly, such a grand strategy
comprises the methods by which the nation will diminish its
weaknesses and neutralize the enemy’s strengths. In practically
every category of factors associated with the art of waging war,
the communists fulfilled this formula, while the United States did
not. Therefore, while the communists mobilized all of the people
under their control in a unified effort, the United States
consistently sought t o disassociate the American people from the
war.
The communists were well aware that their forces were no
match for the far superior power of American combat forces and
knew that engaging the United States in conventional warfare
was pure folly. Nevertheless, they apparently were extremely
effective at drawing on their strengths, while the United States
typically refused t o use its overwhelming might. Accordingly, the
enemy found that it effectively could employ hit-and-run tactics
against selected targets. Coupled with guerilla tactics deliberately
focused on becoming the unseen enemy, the communists illegally
took advantage of the American respect for the law of war. By
hiding themselves among civilian populations, the communists
intentionally sought to blur the distinction between the combatant and the noncombatant, “hoping either for immunity from
attack or to provoke . . . indiscriminate attack.”78 Establishing
well-stocked sanctuaries in neighboring Cambodia and Laos, the
communists were immune from defeat as long as the United
States refused t o attack these bases.
Finally, in tandem with their guerilla tactics, the communists relied heavily on all forms of propaganda, placing special
emphasis on the ambiguity of words t o erode the national will of
the United States t o continue the war. While the North
Vietnamese leadership falsely would portray the conflict as a
protracted war waged by agrarian reformers with no end in sight,
77See KEVIN M. GENEROUS, VIETNAM: THE SECRET W AR (1985).The term
“revolutionary war” refers to a strategy characterized by disinformation and
guerilla tactics.
78Thomas J. Begines, The American Military and the Western Idea, MIL.
REV., Mar. 1992, a t 39, 42.
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it often would promise a negotiated settlement and a termination
of its army’s hostilities a t any moment.
Although many of the factors discussed above contributed t o
the communists’ prevailing in Vietnam, their strategy’s ultimate
success can be attributed to the United States’ failing t o develop
its own coherent grand strategy. Surprisingly, not until 1968 did
the impact of not having a viable grand strategy become apparent
to the American soldier. United States combat troops then finally
began to recognize that they were fighting and risking their lives
to attain no comprehensive national objective. This revelation
initiated a festering demoralization among members of the United
States military forces in Vietnam.
This demoralization was manifest in every action involving
American ground soldiers. In addition, a s the attendant anti-war
protests at home increased, more soldiers seriously questioned the
efficacy of their sacrifices in Vietnam. More importantly, American soldiers such as those at My Lai realized that the emphasis of
the American leadership was not on achieving peace through a
military victory, but on peace through negotiations-negotiations
that constantly promised an end to the war at any time. As a
consequence, no one wanted to be the last casualty in a war that
was not supported a t home and which the United States
government refused t o let the military win. The specter of dying
in vain weighed heavily on the mind of the individual soldier and,
t o a degree, degenerated that soldier’s respect for his own chain of
command.

IV. The Lessons of My Lai
The massacre at My Lai cannot be undone. In developing a
methodology for preventing future atrocities, however, the images
of the horror of My Lai illustrate perfectly the necessity for
abiding by the law of war. The Peers Report also is a valuable
tool in attempting to explain some of the factors that seemed t o
create a n environment in which law of war violations were more
likely to occur. Taken together, these resources teach three
fundamental lessons.
A. Soldiers Must Understand the Rationale for the Law of War
One of the most troubling issues for American soldiers is the
realization that in many of the wars that the United States has
fought, the enemy openly and repeatedly has violated numerous
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provisions of the law of war.79 In the Vietnam War, the North
Vietnamese Army and the Viet Cong regularly engaged in
command-directed atrocities on a massive scale.80 For example,
virtually every American prisoner of war was tortured and
maltreated in flagrant violation of the Geneva Conventions.
For many American soldiers, the knowledge of enemy
violations elicits a negative response t o law of war issues. The
realization that the enemy may refuse to abide by the law of war
often prompts the instinctive response, “Why should I care about
the rules if the enemy doesn’t?’’ Informing the soldier that he or
she will be punished for law of war violations is not enough;
ensuring that the soldier understands the basic rationale for
abiding by the law of war is imperative. Accordingly, military
leaders must impart the soldier with a basic understanding of the
entire concept of the development of rules regulating combat.
If the military establishment cannot understand the fundamental rationale and historical basis for having a law of war,
then the tragedy a t My Lai certainly will be repeated. This is the
first lesson of My Lai; soldiers not only must know the law of war,
but also must be able to understand the necessity and rationale
for having a law of war.
1. Necessity for the Law of War.-Warfare is not a novel
phenomenon; it is as old as human history itself. Even a cursory
review of the practice reveals that all cultures and societies have
participated in warfare-either in defense or in aggression. In
addition, as long as mankind has practiced war, rules have
existed to lessen and regulate the attendant sufferings associated
with warfare. In the modern world, either by treaty law or
through customarysl international law, every nation is bound
legally by a universal body of law known as the law of war.
79See LOUIS HENKINET AL., MIGHT v. RIGHT 126 (2d ed. 1991). The conduct
of the Iraqis during the Persian Gulf War made a mockery of almost every precept
in international law. Actually, throughout the entire war, Saddam Hussein made
no attempt even to conceal his open violations of the law of war, the United
Nations Charter, o r any other applicable international norm. As one Pentagon
official noted, “it was as if Saddam Hussein awoke one morning and asked, ‘What
international law shall I violate today?’ ”
s o R ~supra
~ ~note~ 8 ~and, accompanying text.
“A state may express its consent to be bound by a treaty in one of the
following ways: (1) signature, followed by ratification; (2) accession; or (3) a
declaration of succession. Even absent consent, however, a state nevertheless may
become bound by those standards and norms of behavior that, through widespread
acceptance in the international community, have entered the realm of customary
principles of international law. Customary principles derive from the recognition
of long-term uniform practices among nations. Indicia of customary international
law are judicial rulings, the writings of renowned jurists, diplomatic interactions,
and other documentary sources. See Statute of the International Court of Justice,
art. 38, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993, 3 Bevans 1179. Accordingly, both
international law and the law of war derive from numerous sources.
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Individuals uninitiated to the study of war understandably
may be puzzled that one of humanity’s most violent activities
should be governed by rules of conduct. Some writers, such as Leo
Tolstoy, even have argued that the very establishment of rules
that seek to regulate warfare are per se immoral because such
rules wrongfully cloak war with a form of legitimacy and
therefore are counterproductive t o the goal of eliminating the
scourge of war itself. Accordingly, Tolstoy advanced the notion
that the waging of war should not be regulated. Tolstoy proposed
that “when [war] becomes too horrible, rational men will outlaw
war altogether.”s2 Most commentators, however, have rejected
this utopian attitude, acknowledging the necessity of rules of
conduct to mitigate the various categories of suffering that are
the natural consequence of war.83 The law of war never was
intended t o be an “idealistic proscription against war.”84
The current body of the law of war consists of all laws that,
by treaty and customary principles, are applicable to warfare. The
cornerstones of the modern law of war are the Geneva
Conventions of 1949.85 The basic goal of the law of war is to limit
the impact of the inevitable evils of war by “(1) protecting both
combatants and noncombatants from unnecessary suffering; (2)
safeguarding certain fundamental human rights of persons who
fall into the hands of the enemy, particularly prisoners of war, the
wounded and sick, and civilians; and (3) facilitating the
restoration of peace.”86
2. Origins of the Law of War.-Many people harbor the misconception that rules regulating warfare are of relatively recent
origin, arising in the aftermath of World War I1 or, at least, no
earlier than World War I. As long as man has fought in wars,
however, rules to reduce the suffering t o both the environment
and to other humans have existed. While some of these ancient
s z L T~OLSTOY
~
, WAR AND PEACE 45 (18681.
s3See generally DIETRICHSCHINDLER & JIRI TOMAN,THE LAWS O F ARMED
CONFLICT (19881.
84See DEP’T OF ARMY,PAMPHLET 27-161-2, INTERNATIONAL LAW, vol. 11, at
38 (23 Oct. 1962).
85The 1949 Geneva Conventions cover four categories: (1) Geneva
Convention of August 12, 1949, for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 6 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. No. 3362,
75 U.N.T.S. 31; (2) Geneva Convention of August 12, 1949 for the Amelioration of
the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces
at Sea, 6 U.S.T. 3217, T.I.A.S. No. 3363, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; (3) Geneva Convention of
August 12, 1949, Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War 6 U.S.T. 3316,
T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; and (4) Geneva Convention of August 12,
1949, Relative to the Protections of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 6 U.S.T.
3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
86FM 27-10, supra note 38, para. 2.
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rules would be inconsistent with the modern humanitarian
concepts reflected in the current law of war, many of the
provisions in the modern law of war are derived directly from
some of the earliest formulations of rules regulating warfare. For
example, in the book of Deuteronomy, the ancient Hebrews were
given specific instructions on the protections that were t o be
afforded t o the persons or property of an enemy city under
siege.87 Generally, if the city surrendered, the inhabitants were
not t o be harmed. If the city refused t o surrender, but
subsequently was captured, no women or children were to be
molested. In all cases, however, torture absolutely was prohibited.
Similarly, protection for the environment also was also codified.
For example, fruit trees located outside of a besieged city were
protected from unnecessary damage. Soldiers could partake of the
fruit, but cutting down the trees was unlawful.
Acknowledging that the modern law of war rests firmly on
an ancient foundation of intrinsically acceptable humanitarian
concerns is only one reason why the law of war has enjoyed
universal acceptance through time. Understanding that such
rules are valuable moral axioms only captures part of the
significance of their development and utility. Clearly, the
historical development of rules regulating warfare also follows a
general pattern of what might be termed “pragmatic necessity.’’
While many of the rules limiting suffering undoubtedly were
based on humanitarian concerns, the basic rationale for having a
law of war arguably has been rooted in several collateral
principles of self-interest.
First, under the concept of reciprocity, nations would develop
and adhere t o laws of war because they were confident that their
enemies also would abide by those rules under a quid pro quo
theory. This mutual assurance theory long has been recognized
not only as a primary motivator for establishing rules regulating
warfare, but also as the centerpiece in almost every other function
of international intercourse.
The second element in the development of the law of war
also reflects self-interest. Alexander the Great88 exemplified this
87DEuTERoNoMY20:10-20. But see id. 21:17-18. Some mandates were given
for the Hebrews to kill all of the citizens of a few selected cultures. This practice,
however, was the exception and was related to halting the spread of systematic
human sacrifice and phallic cult practices associated with those cultures.
“Alexander the Great (356-323 B.C.)conquered a n enormous empire which
extended from India to Europe and from Asia Minor to North Africa. Alexander is
recognized as one of the finest strategists, tacticians, and military commanders in
the ancient world. See R. ERNEST DUPW & TREVOR N. DUPW, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF MILITARY HISTORY 47-54 (1977).
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element when, on the eve of practically every battle, he
admonished to his army, “Why should we destroy those things
which shall soon be ours?”89 Under this reasoning, particularly in
the context of securing limited amounts of spoil, the destruction of
anything beyond military targets to subdue the enemy’s military
forces would be neither beneficial nor reasonable. Under modern
principles, similar violations of the law of war would not
contribute to the goal of the collection of legitimate reparationsa measure often employed against the aggressor nation.90

A third line of reasoning in the development of the law of
war derives from an acceptance that abuses seldom shorten the
length of the conflict and are never beneficial in facilitating the
restoration of peace. For instance, targeting nonmilitary property
usually produces undesireable effects. The activities of General
William Sherman during the Civil War illustrate this point.
General Sherman’s widespread looting and burning of civilian
homes and personal property on his march through Georgia in the
fall of 1864 did not contribute significantly to the defeat of the
Id.
goDefinitionofAggression, G.A. Res. 3314, 29 G.O.A.R. Supp. 31, U.N. Doc.
N9631, a t 142. The United Nations Definition of Aggression Resolution states, in
part the following:
ARTICLE 1. Aggression is the use of armed force by a State
against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence
of another State, or in any manner inconsistent with the Charter of
the United Nations . . . .
ARTICLE 2. The first use of armed force by a State in
contravention of the Charter shall constitute prima facia evidence of
an act of aggression . . . .
ARTICLE 3. Any of the following acts, regardless of a
declaration of war, shall ... qualify as an act of aggression:
(a) The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State
of another State or part thereof;
(b) Bombardment by the armed forces of a State against
the territory of another State . . . ;
(c) The blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the
armed forces of another State;
(d) An attack by the armed forces of a State on the land,
sea or air forces, or marine and airfleets of another State;
(e) The use of armed forces of one State . . . in
contravention of the conditions provided for in the agreement
or any extension of their presence in such territory beyond the
termination of the agreement;
(0 The action of a State in allowing its territory, which it
has placed a t the disposal of another State, to be used by that
other State for perpetrating an act of aggression against a third
State;
(g) The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands,
groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed
force against another State of such gravity as to amount to the
acts listed above. or its substantial involvement therein.
89
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Confederacy.91 On the contrary, his actions simply strengthened
the resolve of the enemy to resist, while sowing the seeds of
bitterness for generations to come.92
Clearly, the intelligent warfighter makes every effort t o
comply with, and even to exceed, the requirements of the law of
war-particularly in the treatment of prisoners of war and
noncombatants. A nation’s enforcement of humane treatment not
only demonstrates the best evidence that it is the party waging a
j u s in beZZo,93 but also often serves as the best avenue t o counter
enemy propaganda of law of war violations. As the pragmatic
Prussian soldier and author, Karl von Clausewitz observed, “If we
find that civilized nations do not . . . devastate towns and
countries, this is because their intelligence exercises greater
influence on their mode of carrying on war, and has taught them
a more effectual means of applying force ....”94

A fourth factor in the development of the law of war is a
matter of military pragmatism. Specifically, using limited military
resources t o destroy civilian targets wastes assets that a force
otherwise could employ to defeat the enemy’s military. Accordingly, such conduct is simply counterproductive, and “rarely gains
the violator a distinct military advantage.”95
The final rationale-albeit of greater impact in an era
characterized by the widespread dissemination of informationderives from the very nature of the modern, civilized nation-state.
States that adhere to the principles of democratic institutions and
fundamental human rights will not tolerate activities that are
”See Thomas Robertson, The War in Words, CIVIL WAR TIMES ILLUS.,Oct.
1979, a t 20 (“Although the havoc wreaked by Sherman’s hordes contributed to the
Confederate defeat, this contribution was so indirect and ambiguous that it did
not justify militarily, much less morally, the human misery that accompanied and
followed it”).
”See, e.g., RUSSEL F. WEIGLEY,HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY301
(1984).
93Jus in bello refers to just conduct, in war or abiding by the law of war
under the concepts of proportionality, military necessity, and unnecessary
suffering. The concept of waging a just war, j u s ad bellurn, encompasses several
elements. These elements include the following: (1) just cause; (2) legitimate
authority; (3) just intentions; (4) public declaration of causes and intentions;
(5)proportionality in results; (6)last resort; and ( 7 ) a reasonable hope of success.
With the adoption of the United Nations Charter, however, j u s ad bellurn is no
longer a viable tool in determining when force is lawful. The United Nations
Charter mandates that the analysis for determining the legitimate use of force
turn on the self-defense provisions of Article 51. See WILLIAM V. O’BRIEN,T HE
CONDUCT OF JUST AND LIMITED W AR 37-70 (1981).
9
4 VON ~CLAUSEWITZ
~
, ON WAR 4 (J. Graham trans., 1918).
95H.
Wayne Elliott, Theory and Practice: Some Suggestions for the Law of
War Trainer, ARMY LAW.,July 1983, a t 1.
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conducted in defiance of the rule of law.96 As brought out so
strongly by the My Lai incident, civilized societies will not provide
the necessary homefront support for an army that it perceives t o
be acting in violation of the law of war. Although in the radical
regime97 this factor generally is ignored, in the United States-as
in all democratic societies-this element of homefront support is
absolutely essential t o any deployment and sustainment of
military forces. Actually, the precept that a civilized society must
adhere to basic, minimum “standards of morality transcends
national boundaries.”98
Sustaining homefront support is not always easy for the
military. In part, the difficulty rests in the associated phenomenon of “imputed responsibility”-that is, the responsibility
for the acts of a few soldiers who engage in egregious abuses of
the law of war immediately can be imputed to the entire military
establishment. Accordingly, because Lieutenant Calley and a
handful of others murdered babies at My Lai, some segments of
the public viewed all American soldiers in Vietnam as baby
killers. The mass media largely feed this phenomenon, as
reflected by almost every movie on the Vietnam War. In American
cinema, the soldier routinely has been depicted engaging in
abuses of the law of war or ingesting illegal drugs. That the vast
majority of American soldiers participated in neither of these
practices is not shown.99 Consequently, the best method for the
military to protect itself from imputed responsibility is to make
every possible effort to see that abuses do not occur and, if they
96Zd. a t 7.
97The term “radical regime” was coined by Professor John Norton Moore,
Walter L. Brown Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law, to
describe totalitarian systems that are likely to resort to violence to achieve goals.
See J OHN NORTON MOORE, ET AL. NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 77 (1990). Professor
Moore describes the characteristics of the radical regime as follows:
A radical totalitarian regime . . . seems to blend together a
mixture of a failing centrally planned economy, severe limitations on
economic freedom, a one party political system, an absence of an
independent judiciary, a police state with minimal human rights and
political freedoms a t home, denials of the right to emigrate, heavy
involvement of the military in political leadership, a large percentage
of the GNP devoted t o the military sector, a high percentage of the
population in the military, leaders strongly motivated by an ideology
of “true beliefs” including willingness to use force, aggressively antiWestern and antidemocratic in behavior, and selective support for
wars of national liberation, terrorism, and disinformation against
Western or democratic interests.
g8Zd.
”See SOLIS,supra note 6 3 , at vii. The vast majority of military personnel in
Vietnam served with honor. In the Marines, “[olf the 448,OOMarines that served
in Vietnam, only a small percentage came into contact with the military justice
system. By far the greater number served honorably and never committed illegal
or improper acts.” Id.
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do, to promptly investigate and punish those proven to be guilty.
Under no circumstances can a cover-up be justified; the light
must be shed promptly and fully on all allegations of war crimes.
The law of war in the modern era, therefore, is based on a
combination of rationales that reflect a mixture of pragmatic and
moral concerns. The competent warfighter should understand that
the factors include the following: (1)humanitarian concerns based
on moral precepts; (2) the concept of reciprocity in behavior; (3)
the desire for lawful reparations; (4) the desire t o limit the scope
and duration of the conflict and to facilitate the restoration of
peace; (5) the effective use of military resources; and (6) the
necessity for securing homefront support.

B. Soldiers Must Be Trained in the Law of War
The second lesson from My Lai needs little introduction: To
be effective, the leaders constantly must teach the law of war to
soldiers. The United States military long has held an outstanding
reputation for adhering to the law of war because of its
commitment t o law of war training.100 Unfortunately, periods
have arisen during which training has not been emphasized
properly; these periods provided fertile ground for law of war
violations. If it did nothing else, the massacre at My Lai served as
the “catalyst for a complete review of Army training in the law of
war.”lOl
The primary Department of Defense (DOD) response to the
Peers Report was a directive entitled the “DOD Law of War
Program.” The directive, which is still in effect, lists the following
four specific DOD mandates:
(1) The law of war and the obligations of the
United States government under that law shall be
observed fully by all members of the United States
Armed Forces;
(2) A law of war program, designed to prevent
violations of the law of war, shall be implemented;

(3) All alleged violations of the law of war,
whether committed by or against United States or
enemy personnel, shall be reported promptly, investigated thoroughly, and, when appropriate, remedied by
corrective action; and
“‘But see Fredrick A. Graf, Knowing the Law, PROCEEDINGS,June 1988, a t
58. If the record United States is measured against the rules and not against its
adversaries the record has “been far from perfect.”
“‘Elliott, supra note 95, a t 9.
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(4)All violations of the law alleged to have been
committed by or against allied military or civilian
personnel shall be reported through appropriate command channels for ultimate transmission to appropriate
agencies of allied governments.
Specific responsibilities are assigned t o the secretaries of the
military departments and the unified and specified commands on
law of war training and instruction. The Army is the training
proponent for the law of war for all branches of the military. In
response to that mandate, the Army has developed a ready-made
lesson plan for the law of war instructor, which includes detailed
discussion in the following areas:

(1) The rights and obligations of United States
Army personnel regarding the enemy, other personnel,
and property;
(2) The rights and obligations of United States
Army personnel if captured, detained, or retained;
(3) The requirements of customary and conventional law pertaining t o captured, detained, or retained
personnel, property, and civilians;

(4)The probable results of acts of violence against,
and inhuman treatment of, personnel;
( 5 ) Illegal orders;
(6) Rules of Engagement; and

(7) The procedures for reporting war crimes.102
The current methodology for teaching the law of war
attempts to tailor the training t o the particular type of military
unit. Special Forces units, for example, not only receive constant
classroom instruction on the law of war, but also must answer
difficult law of war questions. These questions deal with
situations that could arise during special operations and are
incorporated in their training missions.103 The much-reported
incident of the Gulf War, in which a Special Forces “ A team had
to choose between killing an Iraqi girl or risk being discovered,
actually was a well-trained scenario which, in the real world,
1 0 2 D O
~F~A’R~MY , REG. 350-216, TRAININGTHE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF
1949 AND HAGUE No. IV OF 1907, para. 5a (7 Mar. 1975); see Elliott, supra note
95, a t 33.
‘03See Gary L. Walsh, Role of the Judge Advocate i n Special Operations,
ARMY LAW., Aug. 1989, a t 6-8; Jeffrey F. Addicott, Developing a Security Strategy
for Indochina, 128 MIL. L. REV. 35 (1990).
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resulted in a correct application of a very difficult law of war
is sue. 104
The one thread that runs throughout the complex web of
ensuring compliance with the law of war is the role of the judge
advocate. To ensure that American forces comply with all aspects
of the law of war, the Army has expanded its use of military
attorneys dramatically.105 For example, all combat forces have an
“operational law”106 attorney assigned at the division level. This
judge advocate advises operational commanders on decisionmaking and training t o ensure that their units comply with and
adhere t o the law of war. The operational law advisor also
examines the full range of international and domestic law that
impacts “specifically upon legal issues associated with the
planning for and deployment of U.S.forces overseas in both
peacetime and combat environments.”107 This is a major change
from the role of judge advocate in Vietnam-a role primarily
delegated t o the administration of military justice.
Currently, the function of the judge advocate can be divided
into two elements: a preventive role and an active role. In the
preventive role, the judge advocate advises commanders on
potential issues dealing with rules of engagement, targeting, and
all other relevant aspects of the law of war. In addition, the judge
advocate is involved deeply in providing actual law of war
instruction and training to soldiers within his or her particular
command.
104DouglasWaller, Secret Warriors, NEWSWEEK, June 17, 1991, a t 20. Each
Special Forces group has a military attorney assigned as the group judge
advocate. Part of the function of this officer is to deal with operational law issues
associated with special operations.
’“See, e.g., James A. Burger, International Law-The Role of the Legal
Advisor, and Law of War Instruction, ARMY LAW., Sept. 1978, a t 22;William H.
Parks, The Law of War Advisor, 31 JAG J . 1 (1980).
“‘See David E. Graham, Operational Law (0PLAW)-A Concept Comes of
Age, ARMY LAW., July 1987, at 9.
‘070ne major effort to prepare operational law attorneys was the
establishment of the Center for Law and Military Operations (CLAMO) by thenSecretary of the Army, John 0. Marsh Jr., in December of 1988. The CLAMO is
located a t The Judge Advocate General’s School, U.S.Army, in Charlottesville,
Virginia. The goal of the CLAMO is to examine both current and potential legal
issues attendant to military operations through the use of professional exchanges
such as symposia, consultations, and advice; writing, reviewing, editing,
commenting on, and publishing reports, treatises, articles, and other written
materials; and ensuring access to a well-stocked joint service operational law
library. The CLAMO serves as a source for, guide to, and clearinghouse of,
information about operational law and national security law. See Jeffrey F.
Addicott, Operational Law Note: Proceedings of the First Center for Law and
Military Operations Symposium, 18 to 20 April 1990, ARMY LAW., Dec. 1990, a t
47-57.
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In the active role, the judge advocate is involved in the
investigation of allegations of law of war violations. The
requirement to investigate is either carried out directly by the
legal officer or is monitored closely by the judge advocate.108
Finally, the judge advocate will be called upon to either prosecute
or defend individuals who have been charged with law of war
violations.

C. Officers Must Ensure Compliance with the Law of War
Through Training and Leadership
As implied throughout this article, the importance of
professional conduct on the battlefield extends to the strategic,
political, and social realms. The primary responsibility for
ensuring this professional conduct falls directly on the officer
corps. For this reason, nowhere is the need for law of war training
more critical than in the proper development of the military’s
officer corps. No officer should be given the responsibility of
leadership unless he or she possesses two essential qualities: (1)
technical proficiency in the profession of arms; and (2) the highest
ethical and moral courage. Under the ancient Roman adage that
no man can control others until he first can control himself,
officers must be prepared and tested thoroughly in both of these
areas. Combat command should be offered only to officers who
thoroughly have been scrutinized and put through extensive field
training exercises designed to test combat pressures.
The primary cause of My Lai unquestionably was the lack of
disciplined control-in other words, the lack of any real
leadership. Leadership is absolutely essential in preventing law of
war violations. The associated tensions set out by the Peers
Report were not the real problem a t My Lai; tensions of combat
always will be present in one form or another. The real problem
was that the leaders failed to control those tensions effectively. A
soldier facing the stresses of war cannot be expected to temper his
actions solely by exercising the level of restraint that commonly is
considered self-control. Rather, ensuring that soldiers know how
to-and actually are capable of-maintaining self-control under
warfighting pressures depends considerably on a commander’s
training and leadership. Sadly, many of the officers in Charlie
Company not only allowed the illegal manifestations of battlefield
l o 8 D ~OF~D’EFENSE
~
, DIRECTIVE 5100.77, DOD LAW OF WAR PROGRAM (July
1979); Memorandum, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, MJCS 0124-88, subject:
Implementation of DOD Law of War Program, (4 Aug. 1988); UNITED STATES
CENTRAL COMMAND, CENTCOM REG. 27-1, LEGAL SERVICES: LAW OF WAR
PROGRAM (3 Jan. 1989); UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND, CENTCOM R EG.
27-25, REPORTING AND DOCUMENTATION OF ALLEGED WAR CRIMES (3 Jan. 1989).
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stress t o be exhibited by their troops, but also initiated and
participated actively in the atrocities-both through the orders
they gave and examples they set. Proper officer leadership
undoubtedly could have prevented the law of war violations at My
Lai. Accordingly, the primary responsibility for these crimes lay
with those officers. The function of leadership is to hold up, at all
times and at all costs, the professional torch. The officers involved
in the incident at My Lai, however, did not merely allow that
torch to fall; instead, they actually extinguished its flame before
those who depended upon it for enlightenment and guidance.

V. Conclusion
Future My Lai’s cannot be prevented unless the answers t o
the “why?” of My Lai are repeated over and over-that is, until
they are inculcated into every warfighter in uniform. Just as
Americans must never forget their rallying cries of honor and
nobility-“Remember the Alamo”log-they must be forced t o deal
with their nightmares-“Remember My Lai.” On the other hand,
precisely because of its horror and repulsiveness, My Lai is suited
uniquely to serve as the primary vehicle to address the entire
issue of adherence to the law of war, as well as the necessity for
effective leadership in the modern era characterized by low
intensity conflict environments.
The American military cannot afford to take these lessons
lightly. Not surprisingly, with the passing of time, many lessons
of history will be forgotten and therefore, many mistakes will be
repeated.110 This human reality is particularly unfortunate in
light of humanity’s continuing efforts at curtailing warfare.
Accordingly, the lessons of My Lai not only must be remembered,
but also must be inculcated.
‘”See LON TINKLE, THE ALAMO(1958). For 13 days in March of 1836, 187
Americans fought off a Mexican Army that outnumbered them by thirty t o one.
The battle took place a t the Alamo a t San Antonio, Texas. Although all of the
Americans could have escaped, they choose to fulfill their duties, even knowing
that doing so would mean almost certain death. All died in combat-killing 1600
Mexicans in the process-to buy time for the birth of the Texas Republic. The
subsequent battle cry of “Remember the Alamo,” was coined by General Sam
Houston in the defeat of the same Mexican forces later that year.
”‘Many military writers have lamented that basic historical lessons related
to combat are not emphasized, even a t the nation’s military academies. See, e.g.,
Jeffrey Record, Our Academies Don’t Teach The History of War, HARPER’S MAG.,
Apr. 1980, a t 26; Jay Luvaas, Military History: Is it Still Practicable?,
PARAMETERS, Mar. 1982, a t 2; T. N. Dupuy, Practical Value Largely
Unappreciated, History and Modern Battle, ARMY, Nov. 1982, a t 18; Jeffrey F.
Addicott, The United States of America: Champion of the New World Order or the
Rule of Law?, 6 FLA.J. INT’L L. 63 (1990).

